THE CONCEPTS. SKILLS OR REPRESENTATIONS? AN APPROACH TO THE NATURE OF CONCEPTS FROM THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND AND COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Abstract

The study of concepts is a long-standing problem that began thousands of years ago in ancient Greece. However, until less than a century ago, concepts were studied from their cognitive and neurological bases. This article seeks to make a contrast between philosophical analysis on the nature of concepts and psychological studies on semantic memory. To approach the philosophical analysis of the problem on the concepts, it is necessary to begin with the classical theory of definitions, pass through the theory of prototypes and conclude with the theory of proxytypes. To approach psychological studies on semantic memory it is necessary to explore the traditional models of hierarchical network and propagated activation; and the new radial network model. This will allow us to conclude, taking a stand against the controversy of the nature of the concepts developed between Diana Pérez who conceives them as abilities and Liza Skidelsky who conceives them as representations.